Clueless Economists

CLUELESS ECONOMISTS?

Gautam Bhattacharya

Professor of Economics

KIMEP University

Almaty, Kazakhstan

And

Associate Professor of Economics (Retired)

University of Kansas,

Lawrence, Kansas, USA

October 26, 2017

I am indebted to Dr. Nadeem Naqvi for some lively discussion which led to the first draft of our joint paper and for graciously allowing me to use the material from our joint paper. I am also indebted to Dilobar Kassymova for providing research assistance.

In my classes, I sometimes show off different categories of economists (boasting that economists are not all dull and/or socially awkward!). I show them handsome economists (yes, they do exist!) athletic economists, superrich economists, transgender economists and many others. The most fun I have is when I show them a “clueless economist”!

Let me explain !

In mid 1990’s, a young researcher from Princeton wanted to test whether competitive markets in real life exhibit a uniform price (Graddy (1995)). She picked New York’s Fulton Fish market – a large wholesale fish market – selling mainly to restaurateurs and grocery stores, where a large number of independent stores operated from the same premises. Collecting a lot of data on sale prices and quantities and running several statistical tests, she found that the prices overall are the same for the same quality of fish. A little annoying item was that she found one ethnic group, Asians (and Koreans in particular), who were systematically discriminated favorably, meaning they usually paid a lower price than others!

It was a competent piece of research. However, the FBI took a keen interest in her research , they were already investigating Fulton Fish Market for collusion and other organized crime related activities! A little later the FBI accused the sellers of collusion, and soon afterwards the entire fish market mysteriously burned down, with all their records totally charred! (NYtimes (1995))

The reality, as I see it now, was that all the wholesalers were tightly controlled by organized crime, prices were not competitive but reflected almost perfect collusion, and the unfortunate Asians (Koreans) that bought cheaper fish were owners of inner city grocery stores in NYC area – they were paying protection money to the aforementioned organized crime group – so they got a little break on the fish prices!

I am sure the reality became obvious after the market burned down in 1996. Indeed, she mentions the involvement of organized crime in her later writings. And of course, I would speculate that she was not totally unaware of this at the time the data were collected and the paper was written (circa. 1991-93). But only the Federal Bureau of Investigation had inside information on this, not an academic economist.

Indeed, even in a market economy, sometimes things appear to be very different from what they really are.

When applying game theory to analyze equilibria in a more complex economy, the possibility of appearing to be clueless is a lot more serious. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, credible threats are usually not executed, so one might construct an incorrect hypothesis where credible threats are absent altogether. In political economy, where complex social and economic interactions are studied, one usually finds policy makers and academics who are blissfully naïve (and clueless)

My colleague, Nadeem Naqvi and myself have been perplexed by the “Stans” – we have been working in one of them for the last few years. On the surface, these “Stans” and other off-shoots of the Soviet republic are doing fine. Some have more resources than others. The BANK and the FUND periodically publish research monographs about foreign investment, business environment, GDP growth and other key economic indicators – assuming, erroneously, that these are budding capitalist economies. There is a steady stream of econometric work trying to predict efficiency of different monetary policy instruments and fiscal stimuli to promote economic growth

But the reality is, these are all “network” states, the “network” being a combination of government officials and others in power. Fiscal and monetary policies have superficial, at best marginal effectiveness in these countries.

The network state collects tributes legally by taxation and illegally by other means from business enterprises. They wield the threat of confiscation or loss of services. In return they provide order which is a combination of infrastructure and protective services. These are the important instruments, not traditional economic policy!

However, the “Stans” are not collapsing en masse, like the Soviet Union did. Indeed, some “Stans” are doing better than others. Some exhibit moderately high rates of growth and considerable private investment and business activity, whereas others only have the basic retail and other non-traded goods provided by the private sectors ! Is it because of their resource base? Or is it an outcome of a more complex game? Clueless we might be, but since we know some game theory, we tried to build a theory of “Stans” to show why some of them are more vigorous than others.

A little background here:

In the 70-year lifetime of the Soviet Union (1922-91), (i) there were virtually no property rights by which individuals had to live, largely because there was extremely limited private ownership of property (beyond one’s own autonomous labor), (ii) other than sale of labor time (hours or days for which labor power was sold), all other sources of income for a household were effectively prohibited, (iii) there were no businesses that households could buy and sell, nor of course any stock markets in shares of private firms, and (iv) there was no developed real estate market.

This was radically different from the economic base (of the relations of production and the associated inter-household distribution of income) on which the capitalist economic systems of the world were organized at the time. Moreover, resting on this economic base in the Soviet Union, the entailed legal and political superstructures pertaining to individual rights over property were virtually nonexistent. This is a huge contrast with the successful capitalist countries, in which the legal structure dealing with property rights was firmly in place, and there were political institutions that collectively were in continuing support of such rights under the law.

By 1991, there was rebirth of fifteen post-Soviet countries, and in these the corresponding collective consciousness of the people was nothing like that in the successful capitalist countries.

What kind of progress have the Group of 15 made towards the state’s provision of greater protection of property rights of individuals, especially to the businesses they give birth to and nurture into successful and profitable enterprises, simply because the greater such protection, the more fertile (profitable) will be the domain of the economy over which private business investment will be made in larger magnitudes, and in higher-return ventures? The larger the annual private business investment, the faster is the rate of growth of the economy’s capital stock, to which corresponds a faster rate of growth of real GDP. To avoid the fate of the late Soviet Union, these countries must adopt a path of economic growth supported by private investment. The data available in these countries are not entirely reliable, the data on private sector capital formation is not available for some, in others it fluctuates wildly. Further, sometimes the network state embarks on a “prestige” project and private investment occurs as an ancillary to this project. Once the project is completed, private investment goes down substantially.


	A snapshot of the Group of fifteen, 2016

	GDP Per Capita	Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP)


		GFCF as % of GDP
Country Name	GDP per capita 2016 ($)	2012	2013
Lithuania	29972	Not available	Not available
Estonia	29313	Not available	Not available
Russian Federation	26490	17.6	18.5
Latvia	25410	Not available	Not available
Kazakhstan	25145	25.7 (in 2006)	not available
Belarus	18000	30.1	32.6
Turkmenistan	17485	10.5	not available
Azerbaijan	17439	11.8 (in 2007)	Not available
Georgia	10044	17.5	16.9
Armenia	8621	22.2	19.4
Ukraine	8305	17.2 (in 2009)	not available
Uzbekistan	6563	17.5	18.0
Moldova	5328	22.6 (in 2006)	Not available
Kyrgyz Republic	3521	24.1	22.9
Tajikistan	3008	4.0	5.5

Data on GDP and GFCF from various UN publications

It is clear that in terms of GDP per capita, some of these countries have performed a lot better than others. The data on Gross private capital formation is not satisfactory, but again we can see a large difference in these numbers between the group of fifteen. Several other countries in East Europe, Asia and Africa, may also satisfy our criterion of network states.

Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP varies wildly, ranging from 4% in Tajikistan to about 30% in Belaraus and 25% in Kazakhstan. (for comparison , GFCF is about 15% in USA which has a very large capital base, but it is about 40% in China and 25% in India) Why is it that some network states are more successful in promoting private investment than others. Is it only because they have more natural resources. Or is the reality more complex?

We applied a little bit of agency theory to look at a game between the “network” state and the agents who may be “qualified” or unqualified”

2. Model

The government (network) provides legal order S and collects revenue (tribute) T. Order includes infrastructure for enterprises plus a threat level for confiscation. This is essential for collection of tribute.

To sustain high return enterprises, the government must provide an order level s_H while the level of order needed for a low-return enterprise is s_L. There are two types of agents:

“Qualified” – who either possess human capital or resources or have enough “network” connections to operate high return enterprises. They earn more from high return enterprises

2. “Unqualified” who earn more from operating low-return enterprises.

An unqualified agent may not be interested in operating a high-return enterprise, whereas a qualified agent has a choice of operating either a high-return or a low-return enterprise.

The objective of my exercise is to see under what conditions the equilibrium outcome will involve a situation where both high and low return enterprises are operated by the agents in the economy. This equilibrium is called a “productive” equilibrium. The other equilibrium is called a “stagnant” equilibrium because only low-return enterprises exist here, operated by both qualified and unqualified agents.

The payoff (surplus) from operating a high return enterprise by a qualified individual is

V = max [U(θ, S ) – T]

Where θ is the agent type (θ_Q qualified, and θ_U unqualified), s_L is the order provided to low-return enterprises and s_H is the order provided to high-return enterprises, and T is the tribute that must be paid to the government (t_L to operate a low-return business, and t_H to operate a high-return business).

Thus, if a qualified agent participates in a high return enterprise, his return is

V_QH = U(θ_Q , s_H) – t_H

If he participates in a low return enterprise, his return is

V_QL = U(θ_Q, s_L) – t_L,

Therefore he will choose to invest in H if V_QH> V_QL , and in L otherwise.

An unqualified agent, I assume, has a very low (possibly negative) return from investing in a high quality enterprise, so his return from investing in L is

V_UL= U(θ_U, s_L) – t_L,

He will invest if V_UL is non negative.

The main point of distinction between qualified and unqualified agents is

U(θ_Q, s_H) – U(θ_Q, s_L) > U(θ_U, s_H) – U(θ_U, s_L),

which implies that the qualified agents have a higher differential payoff between high return and low return enterprises.

The government maximizes a convex combination of the cost of providing order and the revenue earned,

G = – a[C(s_L) + C (s_H)] + (1- a)(t_L + t_H)

where a is the weight placed on the costs. Here G is the government’s objective function.

By assumption, it is more expensive to provide s_H because it needs better infrastructure and possibly higher level of coercion so that greater revenue could be generated from the high return enterprises.

2. Equilibria

We look at three possible equilibria (scenarios). The proofs are in my joint paper with Professor Naqvi (Bhattacharya and Naqvi (2017))

1. The government provides only s_L,enough to sustain low-return enterprise only. It is not profitable for the government here to provide s_H, the revenue generated is the entire surplus of the agents (or the minimum surplus if the unqualified agents are diverse). This is the stagnant equilibrium. Here, the government does not find it optimal to provide s_H because qualified agents will continue to choose low-return enterprises because for them the additional net return from operating higher return enterprises is negative.

2. The government provides both s_L and s_H, and collects different revenues t_L and t_H from different agents. Here, qualified agents choose high-return enterprises and unqualified agents choose low-return enterprises. The revenue earned t_L is equal to the surplus of the unqualified agents – thus the unqualified agents are left with what we call only “normal profits”. The revenue earned t_H from the high-return sector is less than the surplus of the qualified agents, because they self-select to operate high-return enterprises. So the qualified agents earn more than “normal profits”. This is the productive equilibrium.

3. The third scenario occurs where the government provides only s_H and extracts all the surplus by collecting t_H. Here, the low-return enterprises are not functional. We call this a “Highly-productive” equilibrium. This type of equilibrium will not exist if there is a large number of unqualified agents in the economy, or if it is not expensive for the government to provide order level s_H. Thus, this is the kind of equilibrium that a society should strive for under improved governance and availability of opportunities.

For the kind of economies we are considering here, this equilibrium is unlikely to exist because there is likely to be a large number of unqualified agents who will find operating a low-return enterprise profitable even if their surplus is close to zero.

3. Remarks

1. What exactly happens in “stagnant” equilibrium?

This equilibrium is achieved as an outcome of voluntary interaction between a government which provides order and infrastructure and agents who decide to operate enterprises that they find profitable. In this equilibrium, although there are many qualified agents, they self-select to operate low return enterprises because the return from doing so is higher than operating high return enterprises. The government provides only order level s_L because provision of s_H is redundant in this case.

2. What exactly happens in “productive equilibrium”?

When is the productive equilibrium likely to exist? In a productive equilibrium, qualified agents operate high-return enterprises and unqualified agents operate low-return enterprises. Naturally, the level of private investment will be higher in this equilibrium.

I have proved that this equilibrium will exist when the proportion of qualified agents is neither too small nor too large. As we mentioned before, it is unlikely to be too large, so “not too small” is the relevant criterion. This proportion depends on the level of human and natural resources at the disposal of the agents and size and strength of the “network” in the economy

The second result I prove is that the productive equilibrium will exist when going from low to high order level increases surplus proportionally more for qualified than for unqualified agents.

4. More Remarks

We observe, in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, in south Asia and in Africa, different kinds or regimes where appropriation is the norm – both regimes with relatively vigorous economic activity and regimes with relative stagnation. This formulation might shed some light on why some regimes appear to be more stifling than others.

Did I just present you with a well-disguised tautology? Possibly!

So let me check again – what exactly is the implication of all this?

Basically, even in a network society, agents do not curl up and surrender all surplus to the network. Nor does the network brutally destroy the society. The outcome depends on the proportion of agents who are educated, connected to the network, and willing to take the risk of eventual confiscation of appropriation of their entire investment. If enough of these agents exist, and the network finds it not too expensive to provide the right infrastructure for high return enterprises, then the economy will exhibit a productive equilibrium where substantial private investment may occur. On the other hand, if this proportion is small, the network state will only build an infrastructure to support low-return enterprises. In a country like Tajikistan, for instance, private investment and economic activity are on a much subdued level than the relatively successful “Stans”. Each of the countries in this group has a varying amount of natural resources that they can export. But for sustainable growth, they all need development of vigorous economic activity. My model indicates that the proportion of qualified agents, and the “network’s” willingness to provide a higher level of infrastructure and property rights are some of the key elements for sustainable growth.

REFERENCES

Bhattacharya, G. and N. Naqvi, (2017), “A Theory of Appropriation under Self-selection by Agents” Mimeo. KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.
Graddy, Katherine (1995), “Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market”, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 75-92

3.Fire Sweeps Through Major Building at Fulton Fish Market

By JOE SEXTON

Published: March 30, 1995

December 13, 2020February 1, 2021

Traffic in India , Part 2

After writing Part 1, my economist friend, Dr. P brought to my attention Dixit’s book on “order and lawlessness”.

Dixit talks about “order without law” and gives an example of Indian traffic as a situation where order is apparently accomplished without anyone seriously paying attention to the laws. Dixit was not seriously analyzing India’s traffic situation, and his example is a good one for econ textbooks.

But come on ? ORDER? Freaking order? On Indian streets? No sir! What we have is a miserable feasible solution to the traffic quagmire every day, created by absolutely moronic lawlessness practiced by everyone on the road and everyone suffering from serious mental anguish and often physical harm from this wretched state of affairs. This feasible solution comes at a huge social cost!

What social cost, you may ask! I say, open your eyes: Non-drivers and/or people who have never been abroad find it difficult to comprehend the veracity of this social cost, but they bear it regardless.

There are four kinds of streets in Kolkata – (apart from restricted highways meant only for cars)

Arterial streets like Central Avenue, Rashbehari Avenue etc,.

Main roads , with bus and truck traffic along with other vehicles.

Side streets with shops , bustling with traffic (cars, taxis and vans and two and three wheelers) , but no buses or trucks.

Residential streets without shops that are not perceived as shortcuts to any of the side streets (I will call them “little streets”)

Arterial streets actually have more orderly traffic and sidewalks,

But on main roads and side streets, are you worried to walk as a pedestrian? Of course you are!

Social cost #1!

Can you walk to visit others or to shop or walk to work to a place two to five kilometers away? Even though you may be in good health for walking, you are annoyed or scared by the traffic and the noise and you refuse this easy way to get some exercise. In many countries of the world , not only in venerable Western Europe, but in Eastern Europe, lowly Central Asia, crowded south East Asia, Japan, Korea and populous China (yes in modern Beijing with its wide boulevards and humongous sidewalks),and in many other places, you can walk to go shopping or visit friends or go to work, and get some free exercise! Never in Kolkata or Delhi! People drive their cars or motor bikes to go to parks to walk !

Social cost #2!

Noise from Horns

This noise is found to be very annoying to most people. If you go to a village in India or go abroad, your ears are stunned by the silence caused by lack of incessant honking. While some drivers in India are pathological honkers, most use their horns frequently to survive on the anarchic city streets. Honking is primarily defensive and necessary for survival – you come to any intersection, you honk; you pass another car, you honk so he does not sideswipe you; you are taking a right turn , you honk so that oncoming traffic is aware of you. And of course, if you yourself are breaking traffic laws, you honk really loud – if you are passing a vehicle on the left you honk loudly, if you are passing a pedestrian or a bicycle by a margin of 12 inches, you honk loudly so that he does not suddenly move to the right and die from your vehicle hitting him; if you are zooming out of a busy intersection on the wrong side of the road, you honk super loud to save yourself from about fifteen accidents that were going to happen in the next ten seconds!

So honking is necessary in a world of idiotic and lawless driving and everyone is delighted by the incessant noise (just kidding!)

Social cost #3!

Semi-Skilled people can not utilize their skills.

Really, a well-trained monkey can drive a modern automobile with an automatic transmission! That’s the whole point with modern technology. Microwave makes cooking (at least some part of the cooking process) easier, again a monkey can operate a microwave. Ipads make browsing easier, again a monkey can work with it! Modern technology enables average people to handle complicated machinery, we all benefit from it. In the rest of the world average people can safely drive themselves from point A to B, without fear of getting mauled or traumatized. Not in India! I am an average driver of cars who has driven about 800,000 (that’s eight lakh kilometers) during my time in the USA, and I have driven in Manhattan in New York , on 12 lane super highways in California , and on winding mountain roads in the Rocky Mountains, but I shake and tremble at the thought of driving on busy Indian streets. Plus I will need to pay a skilled driver to drive my car. All because of idiotic and lawless driving!

Social cost #4,5,6,7,8 … described below

Delay in commuting, caused by unnecessary traffic jams caused by idiotic and lawless driving.

Fear of accidents, caused by idiotic and lawless driving

Lack of freedom for small children, they can not be trusted to walk on the streets alone, caused by idiotic and lawless driving

Accident victims and heart attack patients succumbing to their ailments because of delays in going to the hospital, caused by idiotic and lawless driving

Terror from walking on the side streets because of roaring motorbikes approaching or driving around, caused by idiotic and lawless driving.

And the list goes on.

Finally, the drivers themselves bear an enormous amount social costs. Just ask, if you will, a driver of a front-heavy three wheel vehicle, like the one carrying gas cylinders, machinery , or food . Those are actually very difficult to operate and the drivers are terrified at all times. The bicycle riders like myself are scared to death every day . It took me about three months to reclaim my forgotten skills to maneuver a bicycle on Kolkata streets. After riding for about two years , I decided to give up riding on Arterial streets or main streets (with bus and truck traffic) altogether. I now only ride through side streets and little streets. The reason is a simple calculation of probabilities:

On an arterial street or a main street, probability of death or mutilation or broken bones from an accident is significant and positive every day, while on a side street or a little street, that probability is very small.

On an arterial street or a main street, probability of laceration, bruises and mangled bicycles from an accident is significant and quite high every day, on a side street or a little street, that probability is merely significant and positive.

I ride for exercise, so there is no time constraint, and I feel reasonably safe on my well-calculated routes, which include mostly left turns and mostly little streets. But there are thousands of bicycle riders everyday on Kolkata streets that live with these odds, because of idiotic and lawless driving.

And I have talked to taxi drivers and truck drivers in India, they are constantly terrified of others, yes even those that break traffic rules constantly are terrified of others breaking traffic rules. They actually feel a lot relaxed on the restricted access highways , but there are only a few miles of those in Kolkata.

So what we see in big cities of India is persistence of idiotic and lawless driving which induces the social Nash equilibrium that is the anarchic appearance of order. A little bit of cooperation among drivers or serious enforcement of laws by a third party will reduce all these costs that I mentioned above- isn’t that something to think about?

I simply point out the cameras that have been installed at major intersections in Kolkata. Accidents from vehicles running red lights have almost disappeared at major intersections like magic, but they still exist at the minor ones without cameras .

Please note that I refrained from discussing health care cost for accident victims , but that is of course part of this social cost.

How did all these evolve? That’s a complex question, I will attempt to answer it in part 3.

P.S.

From Hindustan Times

“A total of 151,113 people were killed in 480,652 road accidents across India in 2019, an average of 414 a day or 17 an hour, according to a report by the transport research wing of the ministry of road transport and highways.

India continued to have the most road fatalities in the world, followed by China, a distant second at 63,093 deaths in 2,12,846 road accidents in 2019, the report revealed. The United States of America (USA) reported the most road accidents at 2,211,439, and witnessed 37,461 deaths in 2019.According to the report, speeding was the leading cause of deaths, while, in terms of vehicles, two-wheelers were involved in most road fatalities.”

“Two-wheelers were involved in 37% of the road deaths in the country, followed by pedestrians at 17% and light vehicles (comprising cars, jeeps and taxis) at 16%. A total of 56,136 people riding two-wheelers lost their lives, while 25,858 pedestrians died in 2019″, stated the report.”

See I was correct about drivers of two wheelers with alleged magnum male endowments and minuscule skills in other areas

December 5, 2020February 1, 2021

Traffic in India – Part I

Traffic in India – part one

Traffic in India is insane, insanely hilarious, insanely annoying and insanely frustrating.

If you have not driven anything in your life, you will not fathom the deep insanity of Indian traffic. A non-driver sees traffic as a flow of assorted vehicles , either smooth and orderly, or abrupt and noisy, or engrossed in snare and chaos. To him or her, the snare and chaos will appear to be the steady-state of Indian traffic. However, only a driver will understand the true terror and lawlessness that engulfs Indian traffic twenty-four hours a day (yes even late at night!).

Even more amazing are the social norms about traffic held by drivers and non-drivers alike in India:

Drivers need to be smart and talented in the art of driving.

Any empty road surface is accessible to any vehicle on the road.

Complicity with all the traffic laws will endanger your life anyways, because others will be angry and destructive towards you.

Playing chicken is good, specially when you are plying a motorized vehicle!

Hit and run after any accident is not necessarily a criminal activity (well, it is, in every country of the world, including India – for even minor accidents – punishable by jail time, severe penalties, and suspension of license – yes even in India!)

Equally amazing are the beliefs about traffic shared by drivers and non-drivers alike:

Traffic is more orderly in North America and Western Europe, anywhere else in the world it is similar to Traffic in India, only a tad more or less crazy!

(Fact: I have been to countries like Kazakhstan in Central Asia, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia and Singapore in South East Asia, Dubai and Oman in the Middle East, and Japan and China and Hong Kong in the Far east, and believe me, traffic is not nearly as crazy as in India – not even close! Assuming traffic is the same in the entire Indian subcontinent, it is crazy on an elevated level in India and our neighbors)

Speed limits are only relevant for highways monitored by cameras only. If you own a motorcycle and firmly believe that you have a stupendous magnum penis, then you have the right to drive at any speed in small side streets, terrorizing pedestrians and other traffic as long as you use your horn frequently. Such beastly behavior will impress your male friends and bring forth quasi-orgasmic approval from all the females who happen to witness this spectacle.

Right of way? WTF is that? A legal term enabling senior citizens and young women to move around as they please without getting mugged or raped? A new brand of deodorant? A new dating app, perhaps?

Yield? What? Yield to what ? To whom? You mean to a VIP convoy? To a politician of the ruling party? To a Bollywood celebrity perhaps. Or, are you talking about yielding to your spouse’s romantic advances? Oh hell yeah, it is a good idea to yield to an Ambulance because it will prevent ill people from dying on the way to the hospital. Indians are slowly learning to yield occasionally to all kinds of emergency vehicles. Are there other traffic rules about “yield” ? You have to be freaking kidding me!

And a case study!!

Let’s now do a case study of a quintessential Indian driver. His name is Ashok Dutta, my close friend. I am thankful for his habit of not reading much of anything on the internet (or anywhere else – he is a talented tabla player) –so please don’t tell him about this blog!! The first time I got alarmed about him was actually in Toronto, Canada. He and I were walking around, not even driving, in downtown Toronto, just wandering about. In any downtown in North America, there are lots of crisscrossing streets and hence a traffic light every 50 meters or so. We were walking normally, until I saw Ashok getting excited.

“Let’s get this one, come on!” He said suddenly

“Get what?” I was clueless.

Turns out he was wanting me to walk faster so we can get step into the pedestrian crosswalk before the light changes. Every time we were stopping at an intersection, we would wait a maximum of 90 seconds or less before we crossed the street. So the entire route involved waiting for the light at crosswalks for a total about 900 seconds which is fifteen minutes – at the most. After he dragged me through the sidewalk a couple of times forcing me to power walk so we can “get this one”, I explained to him that we have nowhere to go , we have all the time on our hands, and there are no hot chicks waiting for us in the guesthouse where we were staying!

The second time was even more alarming! I was driving my rental car around on the expressway in Toronto, Ashok was in the passenger seat. There were large trucks on the rood as well. Several times when I was behind a truck, the following conversation would ensue:

A: Please get the truck.

Me: Overtake?

A: Yes, please.

Me: The speed limit is 65 miles an hour. Both the truck and myself are driving at 70 miles an hour. I have to speed up to about 80 miles an hour to overtake the truck quickly. Why do I need to do that?

A: so you can see the road better if you are not behind a huge truck!

Me: hmmm. The truck is not bothering me.

Then , back in 2017, when I started spending six whole months in India , I rode pillion on Ashok’s motorbike ! Oh the horror! The travesty!

He drives on the left side of the road only when there is no traffic. If the road is busy, he is driving somewhere on the right of the middle of the road because he is always overtaking (or planning to overtake) the car or truck or bus in front of him. So 80% of the time he is on the wrong side, on a collision course with the oncoming traffic and risking a sideswipe with whatever vehicle he is overtaking. Oh yes, sometimes overtaking a vehicle on the right is not possible, so he immediately overtakes on the left, risking collision with pedestrians, bicycles, motorized carts, three-wheelers etc. who do not expect him to come from behind (because they are on their side of the street, minding their own business)

When Ashok needs to actually take a right turn, the monster reveals himself – he just takes a right turn! – no signal, no waiting for the oncoming traffic, and he enters the road on the right side while driving on the right side (the illegal side), sometimes at a breakneck speed, honking his horn incessantly. I have seen him taking a right turn in front of three cars driving abreast, coming from the other side, along with two motor bikes. He cleared the last motor bike by about one foot!

When he is not overtaking, he is riding abreast with two or three other two-wheelers in a tight space, with inches between them and at a great risk of side-swiping and crashing.

Of course, two wheeler vehicles became popular in India because of their maneuverability on crowded streets and ability to weave through traffic. To illustrate this, Ashok took me to visit my lawyer’s house through a busy market street not wide enough for cars. He told me that going through the main road will take about one hour. Through the market, he rode merrily, inches from the veggie and fruit sellers sitting on the street, my feet dangling from his bike passing about six inches away from some fishmonger’s knives, sometimes six inches from another bike’s red hot exhaust. Horns were being blown by all the bikes present, terrorizing the housewives shopping , dogs were running in fright. On the one hand, I was wanting to shrink myself to a human of about one foot in size to escape serious injury, on the other hand I was mesmerized at his unbelievable driving skills, weaving, braking, honking and creating a mayhem on that narrow street full of people, but managing not to hit a single soul or a single piece of fruit.

“There” said Ashok when we arrived at our destination “we saved twenty minutes. You are OK, aren’t you?” I was so far from being OK that all I could manage was to nod my head and he took it as a sign of approval.

There is a basic lack of apprehension on the part of Indian drivers like Ashok, you get a blank stare , a sense of total disbelief when you ask some questions. Ashok takes a very small alley near his house to go home from our place, the alley is four feet wide, just enough for a full sized bike to fit in – it saves him about 25 seconds, He told me a few times “Take this great shortcut on your bicycle when you visit us, it will save you time’” After going through it the first time, I politely refused , telling him “I am not taking that alley. Do you know little children play there? Sometimes old people walk there as well”.

His response was a an incredulous “So?” meaning “why are you telling me this ? There is no chance in hell I am going to hit someone in the alley. I am Ashok, the veteran bike rider.” I did not tell him that there is a beautiful young lady that lives close to my house – one of her eyes is gone. When she was a little girl, she shot out into the empty street and a bike came out of nowhere and hit her, the corner handle pierced her eye. Of course the rider was not our great Ashok, so it is not relevant, is it?

Yes, I told him once, when he was with his wife, myself and another friend. His wife, who hesitates to ride pillion on his bike, asked me what sort of a driver he was.

“A good driver, but he violates 100% of the traffic laws 100% of the time” I replied, causing ripples of laughter all around. Next time though I was with Ashok alone, and I told him the same thing. I could see he was deeply hurt and seriously offended. With a wry grin he told me “ I never had an accident in forty years”

“That’s great”, I said “I am glad to hear that”.

(No Accident? You freaking kidding me? He has accidents everyday!! His arms and legs have lacerations and bruises all the time, his bike parts are being broken and replaced all the time – How the hell do you explain that? Of course he has not been hospitalized with major trauma yet – what a freaking miracle!!)

What is remarkable with Indian drivers is their amazing skills at balancing, weaving, anticipating, calculating and assorted other things that are needed for driving both cars and motorbikes. Oh, the drivers also seem to have three or four pairs of eyes also, because they can always see who is about to crash into them from behind or from the sides, or if there is enough room on the road surface for their vehicle to squeeze through, or if their rear tire is about six inches away from someone else’s tire or foot, so its OK to proceed normally!! If, on a scale of one to 100, drivers in USA are about 50 on average, drivers like Ashok are about 96 at their skill level!

Not all drivers are crazy like Ashok, there are 75% drivers that are equally or less crazy, and 35% more crazy than him. Well, that adds up to 110%. Because, at a given point the extra 10% “more crazy” drivers are writhing in pain in the hospitals, or comatose from head trauma, or going to the cremation ground with their grieving family members – at least they are off the streets, finally!

In the above rambling, I have actually under-reported Ashok’s driving habits. In the second part, I will describe my venture into riding a bicycle in Indian streets and my investigation into the causes for this unusual phenomenon of traffic in India.